The War in Croatia: Temporal Application of Conventional Rules Prohibiting International Crimes by Vladimir-Đuro Degan
flavat\, V.() WM W> Cr031ia -· CPSR. VOI :lO Ho ? 1983. pp $-IS 5 
UDC 341.322 (497.5) •199" 
Croada and the Post-Yugoslav Condia·on: Legal and Poliacal 
Aspects 
The War in Croatia: Temporal Application 
of Conventional Ru1es Prohibiting International Crimes 
VLAOIMJR-E>URO DEGAN 
Faculty of Law_ um·versity of !UjckE 
SummBT)' 
The author discusses the aJ?plicabllity of international law concerning 
armed contlias and !!Specially me provisions about war crimes and crimes 
against bumaniry in the war in Croarla. After presenting the relevant 
information about the origin and the course of the war an Croatia, he 
arg\le.s that all rules pronibiting international criJnt!S (war crimes and 
crunt!S against hwnaniry) are applicable irrespective of the status of armed 
conflias m Croatia. Every international crime remains a crime irre~ive 
uf dare and place of its committal. Therefore it must be UP.!cted that 
both authorioe.s of Serbia and Montenegro and the comma nders of the 
Federal tvmy musr be held resp<?nsible and prosecuted for the crimes 
committed by the re~lar Army forces as well as by irregular Serbian 
paramilitarit!S which they supplied with food, anns and ammunition. 
The Law in Force between Conflicting Parties 
Besides customary rules of general international Jaw, and in ·particular the 
"Manens Clause" from the preamble of r:he Founh Hague Convention of 1907 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land'> the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a party to all four Geneva Conventions on 
Humanitarian Law of 12 Augusr 1949, They are as follows: 
· Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (the first Convention); 
1 This clause in English translation reads: • ... in cases nor included in the Regulations ... 
The Inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the proteaion and the rule of the 
principle$ of lhe law of nations, as they result from the usages established a mons civilized 
peoplf'.s, from the laws of hwnani~. and tht dictates of the public conscience." The 
substance of this rule was confumed in denunciation clauses of all four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and in Article 1 (2) of the 19n Protocol l. 
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. Convenrion for Lhe Amelioration of me Conditions of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (rhe second Convention); 
Convention Relative to the Trcaonenr of Prisoners of War (the third 
Convention); and 
. Convention Relative· to rhe Prorecrion of Civilian Pcn;ons in Tune of War 
(me fourth Convention)). 
The SFRY ratified four Geneva Conventions on 28 March 1950 They cnrered 
tnro force on 21 April 1950. 
The SFUY was in addition a party to both Protocols Additional to the above 
Geneva Conventions: 
. Prorocol l relating to the Protection of Victims of lnremational Armed ConflictS; 
and 
- Protocol D relating m the Pror!'Ction of Victin'!S of Non-lnremarional Armed 
Conflicts. 
The SFRY ratified these two Prorocols on 26 December 1978, and they entered 
imo force on 11 June 1979. . 
The reservations of the SPRY in respect of me duties of l'rorect.ive Power (on 
Article 10 of the ftrst Convention; on Article 10 of me second Convention; on 
Articles 10 and 12 of the third Convention; and on Articles 11 and 45 of the 
last Convention of 1949), have lost !heir legal effect after it ratified the Protocol 
I and Protocol n without any reservations. 
The SFRY was in addinon a pany ro most of human rights conventions 
concluded Wlder the auspices of rhe Un.ited Nations. Conventions relevant for this 
analysis, and of which the SFRY was a party, are the following: 
- Convention on tbe Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
of 1948; rarified by it on 29 August 1950; entered into force on 12 January 1951; 
- Convention on rhe Elimination of AJI ForT'lS of Racial Disaiminarion of 1965· 
rarified on 2 Qcrober 1967; entered inro force on 4 January 1969; ' 
International Convention on rh.~ Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid of 1973; ratified by it on 1 July 1975; entered into force on 18 
July 1976; 
- Convention oo the Non-Applicabiliry of Stattttory I..imitarions to War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity of 1968; ratified by it on 9 June 1970; entered 
into force on 26 November 1968. 
J\ll ratilicat:ioos of the above human rights convenrions were done without 
reservations or objections. 
By virtue of the legal principle enshrined in Article 34 (1) of the 1978 Viena 
Convenrion on Succession of SUlles in Respect of Treaties, all these conventions 
conrinue to he in force in regard to all successor States of former SFRY, regardless 
ot any notification to depositaries on their side. 
Because the exact dates of di~solution of the SFRY, and of creation of newly 
indPpendent successor States, .m18ht be a matter of d!:wute, it is important ro 
stress here that since the begin!'UI\g of the armed conflict on itS soil up to the 
present dare, all these convenli?ns remained in force without interruption, as 
International instrumenis governed by me law of treaties. 
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Jr was the case inter alia of Ankle 1 of the Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Statutory Limita.rions. AJLhough specifying that-"No statutory limitations shall 
apply" to two categoric:; of inremationaJ crimes, and "irrespective of the date of 
their commission", this provision makes an important distinction. Only in regard 
eo crimes again~ humanity it was stressed in its sub-paragraph (b) that they can 
be "committed in time of war or in timt of peace". In regard to war crimes such 
a qualification is missing in irs sub-paragraph (a) . A restrictive interpretation of 
this provision could !cud to the concl~iun that ·"war crimes" can be committed 
only in a situation of a rccogniz.ed international anned conflict. 
The aggressive war, especially against Croatia-with the aim of the conquest 
of its territories and of "ethnic cleansing" of them, had several different phases.2 
These phases would seem, at the first glance at least, to be relevant for 1:1pplication 
of different categories of rules of humanitarian law, and even of those relating 
eo war crimes. 
A Brief Summary of Facts and on Appheable legal Rules 
After the fin.t free elections in Croatia, which took place berween 22 April 
and 7 May 1990. its first non-communist Parliament and Executive power were 
constituted At that time Yugoslavia w-45 still a Federation with Croatia as one 
of its component States. 
Before these events, in March 1989 the autonomy of the Province of Kosovo 
within that Federation was illegally and by brute military and police force 
suppressed. These far reaching dtanges were obviously accomplished against the 
will of its Albanian population, which forms the majority of 90 % in rOOll population 
of this Province. The Governments in the Province of Voyvodina and in rhe Republic 
of Montencgro where in like manner overthrown by organizing mob violences, 
in October 1988 and in January 1989 respectively. 
Subsequently to these illegitimate changes it became impasstbJc to restore the 
subde balance between Republics and Provinces on which the Yugoslav Federation 
rclled, as well as the equilibrium between its nations and nationalities (minorities). 
As a consequence, Yugoslavia itself as a State could .not be preserved anymore 
by democratic changes of Federal institutions. That proved true latter on also in 
the Sovier Union and even in Czecho-Slovakia. 
lr was obvious that after free elections Federal authorities and particularly the 
"Yugoslav People's Army" (.JNA), still under strong communist influence, did not 
recognize in practice the legaJhy of non-communist Governments in Slovenia and 
Croatia. 
1. The aggression against Croaria virtually started with the riot of fractions 
of Serbian population ncM Knin· in Croatia on 17 August 1990, by erection of 
barricades and cutting of communications. 
• For the development of political crisis and cxmflia since 1986 and until S March 
1992, see - Paul Garde: ~ er mon de la Yugoslal'ie, Paris {Fayard) 1992, pp. 251-
334. See also the chronology at the end of the book,, pp. 427-430. 
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At that very moment the situation was ~s described in Arricle 2 (1) of the 
1977 Prorocol 11 as: 
" ... internal disturbances and tensions, such as rims, isolated and sporadic acLS 
of violence and other acts of similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." 
Although no rules of international law on armed conflicts apply on these 
sintations, but only municipal law of the State .concerned, "the human person 
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of 
the public conscience", as provides the pr~amble of the Protocol U. 
The JNA has, however, prevented the Croatian authorities-under whose 
competence according to Federal laws fall these sintations-to intervene, and even 
to reach a political understanding with Serbian Community on its own starus in 
Croatia. 
The JNA had allegedly the task to separate ''conflicting parties". But in soon 
became obvious that wherever a few Serbian attacked Croatian police units or 
premises, the JNA occupied the region in question which was lost for Croatian 
authorities, because it had no acces:; on it. That was a kind of effective conquest 
of Croatian tenit01y before a full-scale aggression by the JNA starred. 
At that initial period there were no human losses, nor even substantial damages 
of prope1ty. But a considerable loss of Croatian income from tourist industry has 
been deliberately inflicted. Some foreign tourists were plundered by rebels when 
returning home from the Adriatic Coast in panic. 
2. The foregoing situarion lasted only for a few weeks. Side by side with efforts 
of Croatia and Slovenia .to reshape Yugosla~a into a confcderalion ~f sov~reign 
and equal States, a "referendum" for Serb1an autonomy was organ1zed m the 
ethnically mixed region of Knin.3 The right to participate was given only to Serbs, 
being residents rhere, or thos~ who arrived or jl!St happened to be there at that 
time. That "referendum" touk place on 2 September 1990. Soon after that "Militia 
of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krayma", composed of rebelled policeman, 
was organized under the leadership of Milan Martic. 
Since then, this local riot evolved into a "non-international armed conflict". 
Article 3 common to four 1949 G~neva Conven:.io1s, and the 1977 Protocol li 
as a whole, became applicable. 
According to Article 1 (1) of the sajd Protocol 11, non-international armed 
conflicts are such: 
" ... which take place in the territory of a High Contracting PaJty between its 
arm.ed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concentrated military 
operations and to implement this Protocol." 
9 In history there has never existed areas within acrual borderlines of Croatia, settled 
exclusively by Serbian population. Before this war started, in the beginning of 1991, only 
in 11 out of 115 communes of Croatia Serbs constituted a numeric majority of up to 
70 %. However, about 30 °/o o.f Croats lived even in communes such as l<nin. In patts 
of Eastern Slavonia now under Serbian occupation in the beginning of 1991 lived less 
than 20 % of Serbs in total popula~ion. 
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In a loose Federation such as the SFRY, the status of three armed forces on 
Croat:ian soil was ar that time not dear enough. Ir is only clear thar rhe open 
rebellion started on 17 August 1990. 
ronnally speaking, rhe JNA seems to be the regular armed force of the "High 
Contracting Parry" of the Protocol 11, which was then the SFRY. The highest civil 
commander of the JNA according to Article 313 (3) of the Federal Constimtion 
was lhe Presidency of Yugoslavia, composed of eight Members, one from each 
Republic and Autonomous Province. The President of the Presidency at that time 
was Mr. Borislav Jovic from Serbia. Even then not all Members of the Federal 
Presidency were infomled about all decisions in regard to the JNA. A secret body 
of tOp Army officers was organized, which non-Serbian Members had no knowledge 
of. 
From the aspects of Serbian members of Federal Presidency and of the JNA, 
the "Croatian Guard", being an armed police force under the command of Croarian 
legilimate Government, was probably a "dissidenr armed force". ln the view of 
the democratically elected Croarian Government it the ManiC's Militia org-dllized 
on Croatian soil. 
Meanwhile, the dissolulion of Yugoslav Federation was in full progress. On 
15 May 1991, the rerm of presidency of BorisJav Jovic expired. The pre-established 
rurn for this post was on the Croatian Member Mr. Stjepan Mesic. By the blockade 
on the part of the Members from Serbia, Voyvodina, Kosovo i Montenegro (in 
the meantime the Serbian Parliament illegally dcstituted the Member of Yugoslav 
Presidency from Kosovo, and appointed a person of its choice), Mr. Mesic WclS 
nol elected on 17 May. 
That was the virtual end of the Yugoslav Federation. As a consequence, the 
JNA remained without its constitutional commander in chief.1 
The matter was in fact of a coup d'Etat organized and perpetrated jointly by 
the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro, and supported by lhe JNA 
3. Following referendums in Slovenia and Croaria-with participation of all their 
citi.:Len.s-the parliaments of these Lwo Republics declared independence on 25 June 
1991. In carrying out the decisions from the Brioni Declaration, both Republics 
suspended their declarations of independence for three months, and confirmed 
them 8 October 1991.5 
• The subsequent election of Mr. Mesic to rhe Federal Presidency by inr.ervention of 
the European Community and in pursuance of the Brioni Agreement of 7 July 1991, 
had no effect. on that situation. The JNA simply ignored him and did not recognize his 
competencies as the President of Presidency. They followed only the commands of Members 
of the Presidency appointed by parliaments of Serbia (one (or 56bia itself, another for 
Kosovo), of Voyvodina and of Montenegro. 
s These events were established in the Opinion No. 1 of Arbitration Commision within 
the Conference on Yugoslavia, of 29 November 1991. This and other opinions will be 
soon published in Inremationa.l Legal Materials 1992. No. 6. The main documents on 
declaration of independence by Croatia and of breaking its relations with the former SFRY 
were published in-Zvonimir Separovic (F.d.): Documenta CrOIJa'ca, On CrOIJa'an History 
and !denriry BJld th~ War against Croada, Second Edition, Zagreb 1992, pp. 131-139. 
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After fulfilling conditions prescribed by the European Community in its 
Declamlion on Yugoslavia and in the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and in me SoVIet Union of 16 December 1991, lhese [WO States 
gained international recognition by a large number of Stales since 15 January 
1992.6 Together with Bosnia and Herzegovina rhey were admitted to membership 
of the United Nations on 22 May 1992. 
On the following day after proclamation of independence, 26 June 1991, the 
JNA corrunined a short·lived aggression against Slovenia. Since arid-August 1992, 
the disguised intervention in favour of Serbian rebels by the JNA, has transformed 
into irs open and full-scale aggression against Croatia. 
* 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was therefore a continuous proces.o;.' lt started 
with !:he forceable constitutional changes in Serbia, Kosovo ami Voyvodina in March 
1989. lr Clear that after 17 May 1991 the JNA has losl the appearance of a 
legitimate armed force of the Yugoslav Federation. 
Therefore, it can be a mauer of dispute ar what time the "non· intcmarionaJ" 
armed conllict, especially in Croatia, became an international one, on which all 
four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 19n Protocol I apply. lt could be already 
17 May, or 25 June. 
IL is important to note here that by Geneva Memorandum of Understanding 
of 27 November 1991, the representatives of the Federation, of Serbia and Croada, 
agreed that wounded, sick and shipwercked persons, caprured combarants and 
civilians will be rreafed according to provisions from respective Geneva Conventions 
and the Protocol L This document referred in addiTion to the Hague statement 
of 5 No.vernber, signed by the Presidents of the six Republics "undertaking to respect 
and ensure respect of imcmational humanitarian law." 
It is maybe more a dispute of principles than of facts in regard to !:he rhythm 
of crimes committed. 
The first conflict between Qoaria police and rebelled Serbian militia with l:hree 
causalities happened on 31 March 1991 at Plirvice. On 2 May thirteen Croatian 
policemen were massacred and four civilians killed by Serbian rebels at Borovo 
Selo in. Eastern Slavonia near Vukovar. On 6 May, during a manifestations in Split , 
A Federal soldier of Macedonian was kilk>d in Split. 
• The applicatiom for recognition were considered by the Arbitration Commision.. The 
recognition was granted on the basis of favourable assessments by rhis Commission in 
its Opinion No. 5 for Croatia, and its Opinion No. 7 for Slovenia, both of 11 January 
1992. 1ne Commission has also concluded in irs Opinion No. 6 of the same date that 
the Republic of Macedonia sarisRes rhe same conditions for recognition. 
1 The Arbitration Commision has established in its Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 
1991 that the SFRY was ·m !be ~ of dissolution•. Jt has funher concluded in its 
Opinion No. 8 of 4 July 1992, lbal this prot!SS of dissolution .. IS now completed and 
that the SFRY no longer exists". Cf., Degan, V., D., Yugoslavia in Dissolution, Croacian 
Political Science Review, 1992, (Zagreb), No. 1, pp. 20-32. 
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The firsr large scale ma'>SaLTc of Croarian civilians has occurred on 2 August 
1991 at village of Dalj in Easrem Slavonia. Bur after Lhat day there were more 
and more frequenr ext:mplary massacre:; of helpless civilians in different regions 
of Croaria intended to spread panic and thus force others to take refuge from 
their homes an<.l propeny. This practice, which was latter on called "ethnic 
cleansing", became far more widespread during the Serbian aggression of Bosnia 
and He:r:zcgovina. Most of these dreadful acts were probably cummined by Serbian 
irregulars or militiamen. 
l lowevcr, as will be sec:n, massacres of civilians are crimes against humanity, 
even if committed in time of peace. Therefore, the dates of crimes propemared 
Cruatia policemen and soldiers are more imporrant for our analysis. 
* 
In rhis respect it seerru imponant ro d~'USS the relationship of the JNA and 
Setbian militia and Serbian irregulars of vanous kinds and wtder different 
appellations and symbols, who were ostensibly nm parts of the .JNA. 
lt is undisputable that the JNA, being a regular force of the former Yugoslav 
Federation. was in all phases on that conflict legally bound by all provisions of 
the "Geneva Law", comprising wtder this term all 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
both 1977 Protocols. 
Under Article 86 of me Protocol T, rhe HiKh Contracting Parties and the Parties 
to the conflict are in parricular obliged to repress grave breaches of the rules 
from these Convcmions.• According to its Article 87, the duty of military 
commanders is ro repress and prevent breaches of dtc Convention and of the 
Protocol-with respect eo members of the armed forces wtder their command, · 
"and other persons under their control".9 
The JNA with it.'> commanders is therefore responsible for crimes committed 
by all Serbian militiamen and paramilitaries whenever it supplied them wim food, 
aons or ammunition, and especially it did nor prevent them from cuiJllllitting these 
unlawful acts'. 
The duty for reparation of losses lies, however, on Serbia and Montenegro. 
The leaderships of Lhcse two Republics exercised virtual control over the JNA during 
all phases of the armed conflict on Yugoslav soil. Ultirnat!!ly the JNA became the 
armed force of their st:ifl wtrecognlud "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" under 
a new name: 'The Army of J1.1goslavia". 
ln addirio11, the responsible authorities of Serbia and Monrencgro did nothing 
to prevent Serbian/aramllitaries and individual war criminals m enter from their 
soil to Croatia an Bosnia and Herzegovina and ro commit their crimes. The 
leaderships of these two Republics instigated riots and commission of crimes. They 
• On the scope of these obligations, including the duty of suppressing breaches resulting 
from failures t-o act, see-Commentary on the Additional Prorot:ol of 8 June 1977, LC.R.C., 
Geneva 1987, pp. 1005-1016. 
' See on this duty in particula:r, ibid, p. 1020. 
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especially in.~ired Lhe practice of ethnic cleansiJlK of non-Serbian popularion. For 
these reasons the UN Sccuriry Council ordered sancrions against rhesc rwo 
Republics under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Relaaonship of Mun.idpa/ and Intemadonal Mw 
In this analysis we rook into consideration some acts of violation of the Federal 
Constitutional Law. and constitutional changes in successor Scares of former SFRY. 
Yet by doing so we did not chaiJenge the dualistic view of the Arbitration 
Commission, in particular in irs Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991 . 
When establishing that the SFRY was ~in process of dissoluti.on", the Commission 
stared in paragraph 1)a) of its Opinion the following: 
"a) thal the answer ro the question should be based on the principles of public 
international law which serve to define tht> conditions on which an enrity 
co~'tirutes a Srare; thar in this respect, the existence or disappearance of State 
is a question of fact; that lhe etfecLS or re<:ognjtion by other Stares are purely 
declaratory;" and 
"c) that, for the purpose of applying these criteria, the form of intemationaJ 
political organization and the constitutional provisions are mere facts, althou,gh 
it is necessary m take rhem inro consideration in order to determine the 
Government's sway over the population and the territory;".10 
Especially important for this analysis is the further finding of the Commission 
from sub-paragraph d) of this Opinion: 
'"d) that in Lhe case of a federal-type State, which embraces communities that 
possess a degree of autonomy :llld, moreover, participate in rhe exercise of 
political power within the framework of i.ru.titutions common eo the federation, 
the existence of tl:e State implies that the federal organs represent the 
components of the Federation and wield effective power;". 
A.nd in this respect, iJ1 sub-pa.-agraph b) of paragraph 2), the Commission has 
concluded rhat: 
··rhe composition and working of the essential orga.nS of the Federation, be 
they the Federal Presidency ... or the Federal Army, no longer meet the criteria 
of participation and representativeness in11erem in a federal State; ... ". 
It is a pity thar the Arbitration Commission could nor establish the precise 
date on which the aforementioned events have occurred. 
10 This doctrine was even bener expressed in the following quotation of me Judgement 
of the Permanent Coun of International Justice on Certain Gennan interestS in f'olish 
Upper Silesia (merits), of 25 May 1926: • ... From the standpoint of lntemadonal Law 
and of the Coun which is its organ, municipal laws arc merely facr.s which express the 
will and constitute the activiti~ of Stales, in the same manner as do legal decisions or 
adminlstrnlive measures. ·The Coun is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish 
law as such; but &..ere is nothing to prevent the Cowt's giving judgment on the ~uestion 
whether or not, in applying that hw, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations 
towards Germany under tk Geneva Conventipn." (P.C.J.J., Series A, No. 7, p. 19) 
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Although inremarional law, as il currently Stands, does not speU out all 
implications of application of rules of inremalionallaw of war on an anned conflict 
which is in itS inirial ph~ a civil strife, some facts should not be neglecred here. 
Within a complex und multiethnic Federation like the former SFRY, the 
leadership of one of irs componem parts (Serbia) has undertaken or inspired a 
sequence of unconstitutional changes in order to impose its power over the rest 
of them. Ir has succeeded ro usurp the power in Voyvodina, Kosovo and 
Montcncgro. As a consequence, it won half of posts in the Federal Presidency, 
as well as the decisive influence over the JNA. 
After these chaoges, this force has committed anned aggrcssion·which cannot 
be jusrified neilher by Jllgnslav, nor by international law-first against Slovenia i 
Croatia, and in 1992 against Bosnia and Hert.egovina. The latest aggression Wtl.S 
perpetrated as an undisguised response ro successful referendum of citizens of 
Bosnia and Henegovina for independence, which was recommended by !he 
Arbitration Commission i its Opinion No. 4 of 11 January 1992. 
For all these aggressive acrs Serbia and Momenegro are now subject to the 
UN sanctions under Chapter VIl of the UN Chaner.11 
Therefore, any successor State of former SFRY of whkb Serbia and/or 
Montenegro will be parts, will bear responsibility for international criteria and 
for damages inflicred so far in Slovenia. Croaria and Bosnia and Henegovina. The 
inremational community is now preparing new measures against these nvo 
Republics in order to prevent them from fwther aggressive acts against Macedonia, 
Kosovo, Voyvodina. or even in irs erhnically mixed non·auronomous area of 
Sanddak. 
Crimes against Hwnanity and War Crimes 
The entire text of Article 1 of the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Srarurory Limitations, reads as follows: 
"No statutory limitations shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of 
the dare of their commission: 
a) War crimes as they are defmed in the Charter of rhe International Military 
Tribunal, Nii.rnbcrg, of 8 Al.lgusr 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3(0 of 
13 February 1946 and 95(0 of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, particularly the •grave breaches" enumerated in the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims; 
b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in rime of war or in rime of 
peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Ttibunal, 
Niimberg, of 8 August 1945 and confinned by resolutions 3(1) of 13 February 
1946 and 95 {0 of 11 ~mber 1946 of the General Assembly of the United 
11 1\ large scale of economic and diplomatic sancrions, as well as these in regard ro sporting 
ew!ll~, tedmical moperation and culi.\U'lll exchange, were imposed by the Security Cowxil 
Resolutions 757 of 30 May 1992, and 787 (paras. 9 and 10) of 16 November 1992. 
-~--
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Nations, eviction by armed attack or OCl-uparion and inhuman acrs resulting 
from rhe policy of apartheid, and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevennon and Punishmcm of the Crime of Genocide, even 
if such actS do nor constitute a violation of domestic law of the country i 
which they were conunitled." 
* 
Let us first analyze crimes ag-dinst bumaniry which are according to the 
aforementioned pmvision absolutely prohibited in lime of war, as wen ilS in time 
of peace. The said Charrer of the Nurnbeq~ Tribunal defrnes them namely as: 
" ... murder, cxlerminarion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane a as 
committed againST any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecurions on political, racial. or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tnounal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic Jaw of rhe country where perpetrated." 
The crime of genocide was dl;!fmed in Article fJ of the said 1948 Convention, 
as follows: 
in the presen£ Convention, genocide means any of following acrs committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in pan. a national. ethnical. racial or religious 
groups. as such: 
a) Killing members of the ~oup; 
b) Causing serious bodily on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
c) Delibe.rately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in parr; 
d) Imposing measures intended ro prevent births within rhe group ; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of rhe group to another group." 
According to Article m, punishable are a) genocide itself; b) conspiracy to 
colllDUt genocide; c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide; d) attempt 
to rommit genocide; and e) complicity in genocide. 
Because the SFRY was also party to the Apanheid Convention of 1973, which 
has enrered into force after adoption of the 1968 Convention of the Non-
Applicability of Starurory Limitations, irs complicated and rather descriptive 
defmition of apartheid in Ankle 11 will be applicable on all successor States of 
the former SFRY as well Articles I and m of the 1973 Apartheid Convention 
also apply here. 
These crimes against humanity are punishable as such, whenever they were 
committed, therefore in all phases if the armed conflict on the soil of former SFRY, 
and even before also apply here. 
It should be ~inted out that although the main victim of these crimes is 
supposed to be avilian population, all civilian goods are not under proteCtion of 
rules prohibiting this crime. For instance, lalUlc:hing indiscriminate attack affecting 
the civilian population or civilian objects "in the knowledge that such attack will 
()egan, V.O., Wnt In Cr~ , CPSR, Vol 30, No ?, 1003, pp 5 18 15 
cause e.'tcessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage ro civilian objects", which 
would be excessive m relation ro rhe concrete an direct military advantage,'~ is 
obviously a war crime. But it is perhaps nor a crime against humanity in all 
circumstances. The same goes for a deliberate destmcrion of historic monumenrs, 
works of art or places of worshi;> belonging to lhc ethnic or orher group \'o'hich 
the aggressive pan in war considers to be irs · enemy". 
* 
The definition of war crimes attracts our arrenrion in particular from theaspecrs 
of lhe problem of their perpetration in time. 
The 1945 Charter of the Numbcrg Tnbunal defines war crimes namely as: 
" ... violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but 
not be limired to, murder, ill tre~ttmcnt or deportation to slave labour or for 
any olher purpose of civilian population of or in occupied cerrilory, murder 
or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of ho:.tagcd, 
plunder of public or privare property, wanton desrruction of cities, towns, or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity." 
Tltis det'inition, although not precise erioueh, nor even all-embracing, is a useful 
guidance on what rhe war crimes are. More exhaustive are however provisions 
from four 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibiting reprisals,u and lhese qualifying 
their "grave breaches".•• Both qualifications are in fact synonymous to war crimes. 
However, after lhe Coovenrion on Lhc Non-Applicability of Statutory Umirarions 
has been adopted in 1968, the Protocol I of 1977 has more extensively defined 
"grave breaches'', and it also extended provisions prohibiting reprisals.15 These 
u Cf. Anicle 85 (Jl (b) and Article 57 (2} (a) (w1 of the 1977 Prorocol L 
11 Article 46 of the fi~t Convention and Article 47 of the second Convention prohibit 
reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons and against pe~onnel, 
bulJdjngs or equipment protected by Lhese Conventions, i.e. medical units and 
establishments including medical and religious peiSonnel. Article 13 (3) of the third 
Convention prohibits measures of reprisaJs against prisoners of war. Finally, Article 33 
(3} of rhe fourth Convention prohibits reprisals against protected persons and their 
property, a.e. persons who find themselves in case of a conflia or occupation in the hands 
of a St:ate of which they are not nationals. 
,. ''Grave breachnes" are defined in Article 50 of the first Convl'..ntion, and Article 
51 of the second Convention, Article 130 of the third Convention, and Article 147 of 
the founh ConventJOn. They are a.s f>llows: wilful killing, ronure or inhuman tre.arment 
includins( biologicnl experiments, wilfilly causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or health; compelling a prisoner of war or civili:J.n to seive in the forces of the host11e 
Power, or wilfully depriving him of his rights of fair and regular trial; or unlawful 
deponation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; taking of hostages; and 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military nec:essity and 
canied out unlawfully and wantonly. 
u Rules on protubition of reprisals are provided in Anides 52 ro 56 of ihe Protocol 
l This prohibition is extended to all ci'lilian objects, cultural objects and places of wonhip, 
objects indi.spensable to the survival of the civilian population, and works and installations 
containing dangerous forces. 
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broader definitions of war crime,; subsequently bind aU parties of rhe said 19n 
Protocol I. The fonner SFRY was among them, and after its dissolution aJJ its 
successor Stares are among them now. 
Now we come to the main problem of the evolution of the anned conflict 
on the soil of the former SPRY. Can war crimes, as being crimes umler international 
Jaw, be committed only during a recognized "international armed conflict?" 
Namely, provisions concerning prohibition of reprisals and "grave breaches" are 
not set forth in Anide 3 common to four 1949 Gcocv-d Conventions, nor in the 
1977 Protocol D. These provisions relating to "non-international armed conflicts" 
are sununary in rheir content. They equally do not provide rules on missing and 
dead persons, on prisoners-of-war, or on occupation. Even their respective rules 
on humane treatment, wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons and on protection 
of civilian population, are much condensed, although b~cWJy not different from 
more detailed written rules applicable to international armed conflicts. 
And because paragraph a) of Article of the 1968 Convention on the Non-
Applicabnity of Statutory l.imJtatlon does not expressly ptovide that war crimes 
can be committed in time of peace, would it be a sufficient argument for an 
allegation that some means and methods of warfare were legitimate as long as 
the armed conflict in Croalia was "non-intc.mational', and that they became "war 
crimes" and as such punishable, since this war became recognized as an 
international armed conflict? 
Such an interpretation of Article of the said 1968 Convention seems to lead 
to a result which is manifesrly absurd or Wlrcasonable, for the following reasons: 
l. Already in respect of the ru!es prohibiting the crime of genocide, which, 
it is true, do not create problems with lhcic temporal application, the Jruemational 
Court of Justice has establishctl some principles which relate in our view to all 
kinds of intemarionaJ crimes. 
ln its Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951 the Court asserted in regard ro the 
conception underlying the 1948 Genocide Convention, that me matter is of: 
" ... principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, 
even without any conventional obligations ... ", because this inremalional crime 
by its inhumane consequences ''shocks the conscience of making and results 
in re~t losses tO human.icy, and ... is contrary tO moral Jaw Wld to the spirit 
an auns of the United Nations. "16 
Therefore all international crimes, including crimes against humanity, but also 
"war crimes", are prohibited because of £heir evil consequences-wherever and 
In Article 11 (2) rhe Protocol I extends "grave breaches" in particular to physical 
murilarions, medical or scientific experiments, and removal of tissue or organs for 
ttansplanr.arlon. Its Article 68 (3) and (4) defines more precisely some above mentioned 
grave breaches of four Conventions and this Protocol •shall be regarded as war crimes". 
'' Cf., I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23. 
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whenever committed-and not l>ccause a group of Slates have defined them in 
a convention in one way or anorhec. 
That is a foroori l!Ue for murder, ill treatment of civilians or mher guiltless 
persons, or for plundenng of public or private property. These acts are crimes 
according ro penal legislation of aU civilized StateS. 
Hence it would be absurd to pretend that rhe same aas were prohibited by 
municipal law of the former SFRY before the armed conflict has starred in Croatia; 
that they became permitted agai!lSt one or against both C!lnflicting parties during 
the period of "non-international armed conflicr" in Croatia; and rhat they became 
punishable as imematio11al crimC'; smce this strife gor form of "international armed 
conflict"-17 
Whether in some phase of evolution of tlli.s conflicr the Protocol n or the 
Protocol I were applicable, is inconclusive in regard to the binding force of 
peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) prohibiting aU kinds 
of international crimes. 
2. The subtle difference in qualification of war crimes and of crimes against 
humanity in Article 1 of the srud 1968 Convention was probably a result of 
compiling some earlier intemarional instruments by its drafters. 
As it was seen, the Charter of Nlimbcrg Tribunal had streSSed only in regard 
ro crimes against humanity that they could be commirted "before or during the 
war", and "whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated". the nrst part of this qualification is repeated also in Article l of 
rhe 1948 Genocide Convention. 
The fact that the iruemational crimes qualified as 'War crimes" are nO£ exactly 
pro.h,ibited in intemarional instruments relating to "non-international armed 
conflict" does not prove that rhe ·intention of parties of the 1968 Convention was 
ro permit them during that phase of the conflict, or even in time of peace. 
Hence. every inremational crime remains a crime, irrespective of date or place 
of irs committal. 
3. FinaUy, aU kinds of war Climes and of crimes 0\grurut humanity were expressly 
prohibited by the domestic law of the former SPRY. They formed the Chapter 
XI of the Criminal Law of the SFRY, entitled: "Crimes against Humanity and 
lntemat.ional Law." 
In addition, rhe "Instructions 011 Application of Rules of International Law of 
War in Armed Forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia",' 8 is one 
of the best and most recent restatemcnts of this part of international law in the 
17 Such an interpretation would be obviously contrary to rhe initial part of Article 
1 of the 1968 Convention on Non-Applicability of Smtutory Limitations. For both war 
aimes and. crimes against humanity it prescribes lhat statutory limimdons shall not apply, 
Mirrespecrive of the date of their commission•. 
•• "Uputstvo o primeni pravila medunarodnog ramog prava u Orutanim snagama 
SocijalistiCke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije". Its second version was published in 
"Siuibeni vojni list' (Military Official Gazette), No. 7 of 28 Apn1 1988, and was signed 
by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, Colonel General Vdjko Kadijevic. 
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world. It provi<.lcs rules on uon·intemational armed .:onflicts (paragraph 16), and 
especially detailed provisions expressly prohibiting war crimes (paragraphers 32 
to 35). 
Thus, no commamling officer of the JNA will be in a position to successful.Jy 
discl.aim his criminal responsibility, when his committal or failures to act have 
resulted in violarions of these rules of his own country, which are the same as 
peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). 
J 
